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ABSTRACT
Beyond its highly publicized victories in Go, there have been nu-
merous successful applications of deep learning in information
retrieval, computer vision and speech recognition. In cybersecurity,
an increasing number of companies have become excited about
the potential of deep learning, and have started to use it for vari-
ous security incidents, the most popular being malware detection.
ese companies assert that deep learning (DL) could help turn
the tide in the bale against malware infections. However, deep
neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial samples, a
aw that plagues most if not all statistical learning models. Recent
research has demonstrated that those with malicious intent can
easily circumvent deep learning-powered malware detection by
exploiting this aw.
In order to address this problem, previous work has developed
various defense mechanisms that either augmenting training data
or enhance model’s complexity. However, aer a thorough analysis
of the fundamental aw in DNNs, we discover that the eectiveness
of current defenses is limited and, more importantly, cannot provide
theoretical guarantees as to their robustness against adversarial
sampled-based aacks. As such, we propose a new adversary resis-
tant technique that obstructs aackers from constructing impactful
adversarial samples by randomly nullifying features within sam-
ples. In this work, we evaluate our proposed technique against a
real world dataset with 14,679 malware variants and 17,399 benign
programs. We theoretically validate the robustness of our tech-
nique, and empirically show that our technique signicantly boosts
DNN robustness to adversarial samples while maintaining high
accuracy in classication. To demonstrate the general applicability
of our proposed method, we also conduct experiments using the
MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, generally used in image recognition
research.
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1 INTRODUCTION
e past decades have witnessed the evolution of various malware
detection technologies, ranging from signature-based solutions that
compare an unidentied piece of code to known malware, to sand-
boxing solutions that execute a le within a virtual environment
in order to determine whether the le is malicious or not. Un-
fortunately, none of these technologies seem to help much in the
never-ending bale against malware infection. According to a re-
cent report from Symantec Corporation [27], one million malware
variants hit the Internet every day that go completely undetected
by many of the most common cybersecurity technologies in use
today.
Substantial progress in neural network research, or deep learn-
ing (DL), has yielded a revolutionary approach to the cybersecurity
community in the form of automatic feature learning. Recent re-
search has demonstrated that malware detection approaches based
on deep neural networks (DNNs) can recognize abstract complex
paerns from a large amount of malware samples. is might oer
a far beer way to detect all types of malware, even in instances of
heavy mutation [2, 7, 8, 15, 18–20, 24, 29].
Despite its potential, deep neural architectures, like all other
machine learning approaches, are vulnerable to what is known as
adversarial samples [3, 6, 26]. is means that these systems can
be easily deceived by non-obvious and potentially dangerous ma-
nipulation [5, 9, 10, 13, 28]. To be more specic, an adversary can
infer the learning model underlying an application, examine fea-
ture/class importance, and identify the features that have greatest
signicant impact on correct classication. With this knowledge
of feature importance, an adversary can, with minimal eort, cra
an adversarial sample – a synthetic example generated by slightly
modifying a real example in order to make the deep learning system
“believe” this modied sample belongs to an incorrect class with
high condence.
is aw has been widely exploited to fool DNNs trained for
image recognition (e.g., [10, 22, 28]). With the broad adoption of
DNNs inmalware detection, we speculate malware authors will also
increasingly seek to exploit this vulnerability to circumvent mal-
ware detection. To note, recent research has already demonstrated
that a malware author can leverage feature amplitude inequilibrium
to bypass malware detectors powered by DNNs [1, 11].
Past research [10, 23] in developing defensemechanisms relies on
strong assumptions, which typically do not hold in many scenarios.
Also, the techniques proposed can only be empirically validated
and cannot provide any theoretical guarantees. is is particularly
disconcertingwhen they are applied in a security critical application
such as malware detection.
In this work, we propose a new technical approach that can be
empirically and theoretically guaranteed to be eective for malware
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detection and, more importantly, resistant to adversarial manipu-
lation. To be specic, we introduce a random feature nullication
in both the training and testing phase, which makes a DNN model
non-deterministic. is non-deterministic nature manifests itself
when aackers aempt to examine feature/class importance or
when a DNN model takes input for classication. As such, there
is a much lower probability that aackers could correctly identify
critical features for target DNNmodels. Even if aackers could infer
critical features and construct a reasonable adversarial sample, the
non-deterministic nature introduced in the model’s processing of
input will signicantly reduce the eectiveness of these adversarial
samples.
Technically speaking, our random feature nullication approach
can also be viewed as stochastically “dropping” or omiing neuronal
inputs. It can be viewed as a special case of dropout regulariza-
tion [25], which involves randomly dropping unit activities (along
with their connections), especially in the hidden layers, of a stan-
dard DNN. However, in normal drop-out, since a DNN is treated as
deterministic at test-time 1, critical features of the DNN model can
still be correctly identied and manipulated to create synthesized
adversarial samples. Our approach is fundamentally dierent in
that we nullify features at both train and test time. In Section 5, we
compare our random feature nullication with standard drop-out.
e simple approach proposed in this work is benecial for a
variety of reasons. First, it increases the diculty for aackers
to exploit the vulnerabilities of DNNs. Second, our adversary-
resistant DNN maintains desirable classication performance while
requiring onlyminimalmodication to existing architectures. ird,
the technique we propose can theoretically guarantee the resistance
of DL to adversarial samples. Lastly, while this work is primarily
motivated by the need to safeguard DNN models used in malware
detection, it should be noted that the proposed technique is general
and can be adopted to other applications where deep learning is
popularly applied, such as image recognition. We demonstrate this
applicability using two additional, publicly-available datasets in
Section 5.
e rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
provide background on adversarial samples and, in Section 3, we
survey relevant work. Section 4 presents our technique and de-
scribes its properties. Experimental results appear in Section 5,
where we compare our technique to other approaches. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2 BACKGROUND
Even though a well-trained model is capable of recognizing out-
of-sample paerns, a deep neural architecture can be easily fooled
by introducing perturbations to the input samples that are oen
indistinguishable to the human eye [28]. ese so-called “blind
spots”, or adversarial samples, exist because the input space of
DNN is too broad to be fully explored [10]. Given this, an adversary
can uncover specic data samples in the input space and bypass
DNN models. More specically, it has been shown in [10] that
aackers can nd the most powerful blind spots through eective
1In fact, “inverted” drop-out is applied in practice, which requires an extra division
of the drop-out probability at training time in order to avoid the need for re-scaling
at test-time. is specic implementation is used so that feed-forward inference is
directly comparable to that under standard DNNs.
optimization procedures. In multi-class classication tasks, the
adversarial samples uncovered through this optimization can cause
a DNN model to classify a data point into a class other than the
correct one (and, oentimes, not even a reasonable alternative).
Furthermore, according to [28], DNNmodels that share the same
design goal, for example recognizing the same image set, all approx-
imate a common highly complex, nonlinear function. erefore, a
relatively large fraction of adversarial examples generated from one
trained DNN will be misclassied by other DNN models trained
from the same data set but with dierent hyper-parameters. Given
a target DNN, we refer to adversarial samples that are generated
from other dierent DNN models but still maintain their aack
ecacy against the target as cross-model adversarial samples.
Adversarial samples are generated by computing the derivative
of the cost function with respect to the network’s input variables.
e gradient of any input sample represents a direction vector
in this high-dimensional input space. Along this direction, any
small change of this input sample will cause a DNN to generate
a completely dierent prediction result. is particular direction
is important since it represents the most eective way to degrade
the performance of a DNN. Discovering this particular direction is
done by passing the layer gradients from the output layer all the
way back to the input layer via back-propagation. e gradient
at the input may then be applied to the input samples to cra a
adversarial examples.
To be more specic, let us dene a cost function L(θ ,X ,Y ),
where θ , X and Y denotes the parameters of the DNN, the input
dataset, and the corresponding labels respectively. In general, ad-
versarial samples are created by adding an adversarial perturbation
δX to real samples. In [10], the straightforward fast gradient sign
method was proposed for calculating adversarial perturbations as
shown in (1):
δX = ϕ · siдn(JL(X )), (1)
here δX is calculated by multiplying the sign of the gradients of real
sample X with some coecient ϕ. JL(X ) denotes the derivative of
the cost function L(·) with respect to X . ϕ controls the scale of the
gradients to be added.
An adversarial perturbation indicates the actual direction vec-
tor to be added to real samples. is vector drives a data point X
towards a direction that the cost function L(·) is signicantly sen-
sitive to. However, it should be noted that δX must be maintained
within a small scale. Otherwise adding δX will cause signicant
distortions to real samples, leaving the manipulation to be easily
detected.
3 RELATEDWORK
In order to counteract adversarial samples, recent research has been
mainly focused on two dierent approaches – data augmentation
and model complexity enhancement. In this section, we summarize
these techniques and discuss their limitations as follows.
3.1 Data Augmentation
To resolve the issue of “blind spots” (a more informal name given
to adversarial samples), many methods that could be considered
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as sophisticated forms of data augmentation2 have been proposed
(e.g. [10, 12, 21]). In principle, these methods expand their training
set by combining known samples with potential blind spots, the
process of which has been called adversarial training [10]. Here, we
analyze the limitations of data augmentationmechanisms and argue
that these limitations also apply to adversarial training methods.
Given the high dimensionality of data distributions that a DNN
typically learns from, the input space is generally considered in-
nite [10]. is implies that, for each DNN model, there could also
be an adversarial space carrying an innite amount of blind spots.
erefore, data augmentation based approaches face the challenge
of covering these very large spaces. Since adversarial training is a
form of data augmentation, such a tactic cannot possibly hope to
cover an innite space.
Adversarial training can be formally described as adding a regu-
larization term known as DataGrad to a DNN’s training loss func-
tion [21]. e regularization penalizes the directions uncovered
by adversarial perturbations (introduced in Section 2). erefore,
adversarial training works to improve the worst case performance
of a standard DNN. Treating the standard DNN much like a genera-
tive model, adversarial samples are produced via back-propagation
and mixed into the training set and directly integrated into the
model’s learning phase. Despite the fact that there exists an in-
nite amount of adversarial samples, adversarial training has been
shown to be eective in defending against those which are power-
ful and easily craed. is is largely due to the fact that, in most
adversarial training approaches [10, 21], adversarial samples can be
generated eciently for a particular type of DNN. e fast gradient
sign method [10] can generate a large pool of adversarial samples
quickly while DataGrad [21] focuses on dynamically generating
them per every parameter update. However, the simplicity and
eciency of generating adversarial samples also makes adversarial
training vulnerable when these two properties are exploited to at-
tack the adversarial training method itself. Given that there exist
innite adversarial samples, we would need to repeat an adversarial
training procedure each time a new adversarial example is discov-
ered. Let us briey consider DataGrad [21], which could be viewed
as taking advantage of adversarial perturbations to beer explore
the underlying data manifold. While this leads to improved gener-
alization, it does not oer any guarantees in covering all possible
blind-spots. In this work, we do not address this issue by training
a DNN model that covers the entire adversarial space. Rather, our
design principle is to increase the diculty for adversaries to nd
adversarial space in an ecient manner.
3.2 Enhancing Model Complexity
DNN models are already complex, with respect to both the nonlin-
ear function that they try to approximate as well as their layered
composition of many parameters. However, the underlying archi-
tecture is straightforward when it comes to facilitating the ow of
information forwards and backwards, greatly alleviating the eort
in generating adversarial samples. erefore, several ideas [12, 23]
have been proposed to enhance the complexity of DNN models,
2Data augmentation refers to articially expanding the data-set. In the case of images,
this can involve deformations and transformations, such as rotation and scaling, of
original samples to create new variants.
Input Nullification Hidden OutputHidden
...
.
Figure 1: A DNN equipped with a random feature nullica-
tion layer.
aiming to improve the tolerance of complex DNN models with
respect to adversarial samples generated from simple DNN models.
[23] developed a defensive distillationmechanism, which trains a
DNN from data samples that are “distilled” from another DNN. By
using the knowledge transferred from the other DNN, the learned
DNN classiers become less sensitive to adversarial samples. Al-
though shown to be eective, this method is still vulnerable. is
is because both DNN models used in this defense can be approx-
imated by an adversary via training two other DNN models that
share the same functionality and have similar performance. Once
the two approximating DNN models are learned, the aacker can
generate adversarial samples specic to this distillation-enhanced
DNNmodel. Similar to [23], [12] proposed to stack an auto-encoder
together with a standard DNN. It shows that this auto-encoding
enhancement increases a DNN’s resistance to adversarial samples.
However, the authors also admit that this stacked model can be
easily approximated and exploited.
Given the observation and analysis above, going beyond conceal-
ing adversarial space, we argue that an adversary-resistant DNN
model also needs to be robust against adversarial samples generated
from its best approximation. In light of these, this paper presents
a new adversary-resistant DNN that not only increases the di-
culty in nding its blind spots but also immunizes itself against
adversarial samples generated from its best approximation.
4 RANDOM FEATURE NULLIFICATION
Figure 1 illustrates a DNN equipped with our random feature nul-
lication method. Dierent from a standard DNN, it introduces
an additional layer between the input and the rst hidden layer.
is intermediate layer is stochastic, serving as the source of ran-
domness during both training and testing phases. In particular, it
randomly nullies or masks the features within the input. Let us
consider image recognition as an example. When a DNN passes
an image sample through the layer, it randomly cancels out some
pixels within the image and then feeds the partially corrupted im-
age to the rst hidden layer. e proportion of pixels nullied is
determined from hyper parameters µp and σ 2p .
In this section, in addition to describing feature nullication and
how to train a model using it, we will explain why our method
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oers theoretical guarantees of resistance and how it is dierent
from other adversary-resistant techniques.
4.1 Model Description
Given input samples denoted by X ∈ RN×M , where N and M
denote the number of samples and features, respectively, random
feature nullication amounts to simply performing element-wise
multiplication of X with ˆIp . Here, ˆIp ∈ RN×M is a mask matrix
with the same dimensions as X . Note that in performing random
nullication, it is inevitable that some feature information, which
might be useful for classication, will be lost. To compensate for
this, we choose to set a dierent nullication rate for each data
sample. We hypothesize that this process could potentially lead
to a beer exploration of the input data’s underlying manifold
during training, ultimately obtaining a slightly beer classication
performance. We will verify this hypothesis with an experiment in
malware classication in Section 5.
When training a DNN, for each input sample xi a corresponding
Ipi is generated, where Ipi is a binary vector, where each element
is either 0 or 1. In Ipi , the total number of zeros, determined by
pi , are randomly distributed, following the uniform distribution.
Formally, we denote the number of zeros in Ipi as dM · pi e, which
will be randomly located, where d·e is the ceiling function. Note
that pi is sampled from a Gaussian distribution N(µp ,σ 2p ).
From Figure 1, random feature nullication can be viewed as a
process in which a specialized layer simply passes nullied input
to a standard DNN. As such, the objective function of a DNN with
random feature nullication can be dened as follows.
min
θ
N∑
i=1
L ( f (xi , Ipi ;θ ),yi ) . (2)
Here, yi is the label of the input xi and θ represents the set of model
parameters. e random feature nullication process is represented
by function q(xi , Ipi ) = xi  Ipi , where  denotes the Hadamard-
Product and f (xi , Ipi ;θ ) = f (q(xi , Ipi );θ ).
During training, Equation (2) can be solved using stochastic
gradient descent in a manner similar to that of a standard DNN.
e only dierence is that for each training sample, the randomly
picked Ipi is xed during forward and backward propagation until
the next training sample arrives. is makes it feasible to compute
the derivative of L ( f (xi , Ipi ;θ ),yi ) with respect to θ and update θ
accordingly. During the testing process, when model parameters
are xed, in order to get stable test results, we use the expectation of
the Gaussian distribution N(µp ,σ 2p ) as a substitute for the random
variable pi . More specically, we generate a vector Ip following the
same procedure described earlier, but with p equal to µp .
4.2 Analysis: Model Resistance to Adversaries
We will now present a theoretical analysis of our model’s ability
to resist adversarial samples. First, recall (Section 2) that an adver-
sary needs to generate adversarial perturbations in order to cra
adversarial samples. According to Equation 1, the adversarial per-
turbation is generated by computing the derivative of the DNN’s
cost function with respect to the input samples.
Now let us assume that an adversary uses the same procedure to
aack our proposed model. To be specic, the adversary computes
Backpropagation
Feed-forward
DNN
Feed-forward DNN
Figure 2: An example of generating an adversarial sample
and testing it on a DNN with random feature nullication.
the partial derivative of L ( f (x˜ , Ip ;θ ), y˜) with respect to x˜ , where x˜
denotes an arbitrary testing sample and y˜ denotes the corresponding
label. More formally, the adversary needs to solve the following
derivative:
JL(x˜) =
∂L ( f (x˜ , Ip ;θ ), y˜)
∂x˜
= JL(q) ·
∂q(x˜ , Ip )
∂x˜
.
(3)
where JL(q) = ∂L
(
f (x˜ , Ip ;θ ), y˜
)/∂q(x˜ , Ip ). Here, as mentioned
earlier, Ip is a mask matrix used during testing. Once the derivative
above (Equation (3)) is calculated, an adversarial sample can be
craed by adding ϕ · siдn(JL(x˜)) to x˜ , following [10].
To resolve Equation (3), both JL(q) and ∂q(x˜ , Ip )/∂x˜ need to
be computed. Note that JL(q) can be easily solved using back
propagation of errors. However, term ∂q(x˜ , Ip )/∂x˜ carries random
variable Ip , making derivative computation impossible. In other
words, it is the random variable Ip itself that prohibits aackers
from computing a derivative needed to produce an adversarial
perturbation.
Recall that for each sample, the locations of zeroes within Ip are
randomly distributed. It is almost impossible for an adversary to
pick up a value for Ip that will match that which was randomly
generated. erefore, for this adversary, the best practice would be
to approximate the value of Ip . To allow this adversary to make the
best possible approximation, we further assume that the value of p
is known. With this assumption, one can randomly sample Ip and
treat it as a best approximation I∗p . Using this approximation, the ad-
versary then computes the most powerful adversarial perturbation.
As shown in the top shaded region of Figure 2, for the black-boxed
DNN, we assume the most powerful adversarial perturbation is δ x˜ .
en, the adversarial perturbation for real sample x˜ is δ x˜  I∗p .
Assume the adversary uses a synthesized adversarial sample
x˜ +δ x˜  I∗p to aack the system shown in the boom shaded region
of Figure 2. As we can see, the synthesized sample must pass
through the the feature nullication layer before passing through
the actual DNN.We describe this nullication in the following form.(
x˜ + δ x˜  I∗p
)  Ip = (x˜  Ip ) + δ x˜  I∗p  Ip . (4)
Here, x˜  Ip is a nullied real sample, and δ  I∗p  Ip represents
the adversarial perturbation added to it. With I∗p  Ip , even though
δ x˜ is the adversarial perturbation that impacts the DNN the most,
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this high-impact adversarial perturbation is still distorted and no
longer represents the most eective perturbation for fooling the
DNN. In Section 5, we will provide empirical evidence to further
validate this result.
In short, stochasticity, which naturally comes from Ip , is poten-
tially our best defense against adversarial perturbation. It is also
important to interpret our particular form of drop-out as a form
of “security through randomness”. Our parametrized feature nul-
lication input layer, does not serve as a form of implicit model
ensembling (or Bayesian averaging, which drop-out has been shown
to be equivalent to in the case of single hidden-layer networks),
especially given that randomness is still introduced at test-time.
4.3 Comparison with Existing Defense
Methods
In the following, we thoroughly analyze the limited resistance
provided by existing defense techniques introduced in Section 3.
According to [14, 21, 25], existing defense techniques can be gener-
alized as training a standard DNNwith various regularization terms
(or even more generally as the DataGrad=regularized objective).
More formally, the general objective is as follows:
min
θ
G(θ , x˜ , y˜) = L(θ , x˜ , y˜) + γ · R(θ , x˜ , y˜), (5)
where L(θ , x˜ , y˜) is the training objective for a standard DNN, and
R(θ , x˜ , y˜) is a regularization term. Here, γ controls the strength
of the regularization. By adding regularization, (5) penalizes the
direction represented by the adversarial perturbation that is optimal
for craing adversarial samples.
However, existing defense methods that fall under this unifying
framework are still vulnerable to adversarial samples problems, as
shown below. To cra an adversarial sample from a model trained
by solving (5), an adversary can easily produce an adversarial per-
turbation by computing the derivative with respect to a test sample
x˜ as follows:
JG(x˜) =
∂G(θ , x˜ , y˜)
∂x˜
=
∂
(L(θ , x˜ , y˜) + γR(θ , x˜ , y˜))
∂x˜
.
(6)
is indicates that prior studies only construct DNN models that
are resistant to adversarial samples that target a standard DNN but
do not build resistance to adversarial samples that would be gener-
ated to trick these newly “hardened” models. In addition, as we will
show in Section 5, the added regularization only imposes a limited
penalty to the most eective adversarial perturbation. Hence these
methods might still be ineective against adversarial samples that
target standard DNNs, especially if an adversary simply increases
the scale factor ϕ when generating adversarial samples.
In other words, according to [10], the space containing both real
samples and adversarial samples is too broad to be exhaustively
explored. In the end, since adversarial training is a form of data
augmentation, it cannot possibly hope to fully solve this problem.
While all machine learning methods are susceptible to a broad space
of adversarial samples, our proposed method, however, is a model-
complexity-based approach that hardly adds any extra parameters,
thus leaving the per-iteration run-time relatively untouched.
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we rst evaluate our proposed technique and com-
pare it with adversarial training and dropout for a malware clas-
sication task using the dataset from [4]. en we will show that
our proposed method can be integrated with existing adversarial
training methods and compare the combined approach’s perfor-
mance with both standalonemethods – random feature nullication
(RFN) and adversarial training, respectively. Finally, we will demon-
strate the generality of our proposed method by conducting some
experiments in image recognition. In particular, we contrast our
method with adversarial training and dropout on the MNIST [17]
and CIFAR-10 [16] datasets.
5.1 Datasets & Experimental Design
To comprehensively evaluate our method, we measure classica-
tion accuracy as well as model resistance to adversarial samples.
In particular, to evaluate and compare the resistance of all three
defense techniques, we test the DNN models against adversarial
samples generated from the exact models trained either with RFN,
adversarial training, and dropout. is means that we created three
adversarial sample pools, one for each dataset (i.e., malware dataset,
MNIST and CIFAR-10). e evaluation of resistance assumes that
adversaries had acquired the full knowledge of each DNN model
(i.e. hyper-parameters) and could construct the most eective ad-
versarial samples to the best of their abilities. In this experimental
seing, the observed resistance will then reect a lower bound on
model resistance against adversarial samples. For each dataset, we
specify how to cra adversarial samples, especially with respect to
the malware dataset.
Malware. e malware dataset we experimented with is a collec-
tion of window audit logs3. e dimensionality of the feature-space
for each audit log sample is reduced to 10,000 according to the fea-
ture select metric used in [4]. Each feature indicates the occurrence
of either a single event or a sequence of events4, thus taking on the
value of 0 or 1. Here, 0 indicates that the sequence of events did
not occur while 1 indicates the opposite. Classication labels are
either 1, indicating a malware variant, or 0, indicating a benign pro-
gram. e dataset is split into 26,078 training examples, with 14,399
benign soware samples and 11,679 malicious soware samples,
and 6,000 testing samples, with 3,000 benign soware samples and
3,000 malicious soware samples. e task is to classify whether a
given sample is benign or malicious.
Adversarial perturbation for malware samples can be computed
according to Equation (1). However, a bit of care must be taken
when generating adversarial samples for the malware dataset. Mal-
ware samples are usually represented by features that take on dis-
crete and nite values, e.g. records of le system accesses, types of
system calls incurred, etc. erefore, it is more appropriate to use
the l0 distance:
| |xˆ − x | |0 < ε, (7)
where xˆ = x + δx represents adversarial samples generated from
legitimate sample x .
3Window audit logs are collected using standard, built-in facilities, composed of two
sources–users of a enterprise network as well as sandboxed virtual machine simulation
runs using a set of malicious and benign binaries
4e number of events in one sequence can be as high as 3.
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Examples of Changed Features
WINDOWS FILE:Execute:[system]\slc.dll,
WINDOWS FILE:Execute:[system]\cryptsp.dll
WINDOWS FILE:Execute:[system]\wersvc.dll,
WINDOWS FILE:Execute:[system]\faultrep.dll
WINDOWS FILE:Execute:[system]\imm32.dll,
WINDOWS FILE:Execute:[system]\wer.dll
WINDOWS FILE:Execute:[system]\ntmarta.dll,
WINDOWS FILE:Execute:[system]\apphelp.dll
WINDOWS FILE:Execute:[system]\faultrep.dll,
WINDOWS FILE:Execute:[system]\imm32.dll
Table 1: Illustration of manipulated features in malware
dataset: each feature in this table contains a sequence of two
events. e two events in each row happened in the same or-
der as displayed.
A similar approach was also adopted in [11]. Furthermore, as
discussed in [11], malware data contains stricter semantics in com-
parison to image data. In our case, each feature of a malware sample
indicates whether or not a potential bit of malware has initiated
a certain le system access. erefore, large-scale manipulations
across all features, as is typically done with image data, may break
down a malicious program’s functionality. To avoid this, we restrict
the total number of manipulations that can occur per malware sam-
ple to be as small as possible. In this paper’s seing, we set this to
be 10. Moreover, since removing certain le system calls may also
jeopardize a malware’s internal logic, we further restrict the manip-
ulation by only allowing the addition of new le system accesses.
is equivocates to only positive manipulations, i.e. changing a
feature from 0 to 1. Finally, since malware manipulation is done
with the intent of fooling a DNNmalware classier, there is no need
to modify a benign application such that it is classied as malicious.
erefore, in our experiments we only generate adversarial samples
from the malware data points. In Table 1, we show a few examples
of features added to a malware sample. ese added features only
cause the malware to call several dynamically linked library les
without damaging the program’s malicious intent.
MNIST & CIFAR-10. e MNIST dataset is composed of 70,000
greyscale images (of 28×28, or 784, pixels) of handwrien digits,
ranging from 0 to 9. e dataset is split into a training set of 60,000
samples and a test set of 10,000 samples.
e CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 60,000 images, divided into
10 classes. e training split contains 50,000 samples while the
test split contains 10,000 samples. Since the samples of CIFAR-10
dataset are color images, each image is made up of 32×32 pixels
where each pixel is represented by three color channels (i.e., RGB).
For the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, we generate adversarial
samples by simply adding the adversarial perturbation δx , intro-
duced in Section 2), directly to the original image (since feature
values are continuous/real-valued). e degree of manipulation is
controlled by selecting dierent ϕ, as in Equation (1).
5.2 Malware Classication Results
Sensitivity to Nullication RateWe rst implement a group of
experiments to quantify the eect that nullication rates have on
model classication accuracy as well as model resistance. More
specically, we allow the nullication rate to range from 10% to
Expectation of
nullication rates (%)
Malware
Accuracy (%) Resistance (%)
10 95.22 36.46
20 94.67 36.76
30 93.92 38.56
40 95.20 45.19
50 93.18 51.43
60 93.77 49.03
70 93.10 53.96
80 93.08 62.30
90 90.88 64.86
Table 2: Classication accuracy vs. model resistance with
various feature nullication rates on the malware dataset.
Note that the nullication rate hyper-parameter p is simply
an expectation, as detailed in Section 4, while the other hy-
per parameter σ is set to be 0.05 for these experiments.
90% with 10% increments, both at training and testing time. By
comparing each experiment result, we may then select the optimal
nullication rate. We then integrate our defense mechanism with
adversarial training and compare it against all aforementioned
methods.
Measures of classication accuracy and model resistance, cor-
responding to dierent nullication rates, are shown in Table 2.
As observed in Table 2, the classication accuracy of trained mod-
els decreases when the nullication rate is increased except when
nullication rate is at 40% or 60%. ese two rates may roughly
imply the proportion of noise contained within the original dataset.
e average classication accuracy is 93.66% while the highest
achieved is 95.22, when nullication rate is 10%. is shows us that
classication performance is more negatively impacted as more
important features are discarded. Note that the accuracy remains at
a surprisingly high value even when the nullication rate reaches
90%. is aligns with the fact that the malware data is quite sparse.
On the contrary, as shown in Table 2, model resistance shows the
opposite trend. Maximum resistance against adversarial samples is
reached at a 90% nullication rate. Clearly, with such a high nul-
lication rate, more carefully manipulated features are discarded.
e dierent trends for both classication accuracy and resistance
demonstrate well the trade-o between achieving one of the two
key goals (i.e., accuracy and robustness). By examining Table 2, we
adopt 80% as our feature nullication rate expectation for experi-
ments that follow, as the trained model with this nullication rate
maintains the best balance between resistance and accuracy.
Comparative ResultsNext, we implement ve distinct DNNmod-
els by training them with dierent learning techniques as specied
in Table 3. We present the architecture of these DNN models as
well as the corresponding hyper-parameters in the Appendix. With
certain perturbations added to the data samples, Table 3 rst shows
that the standard DNN model exhibits poor resistance when classi-
fying adversarial samples. Surprisingly, as shown for dropout and
adversarial training, these two methods yield even worse resistance
compared to the standard DNN. is strengthens our previous anal-
ysis in Section 4. Although these mechanisms have been shown to
provide certain resistance to already seen adversarial samples and
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Defense Methods MalwareAccuracy (%) Resistance (%)
Standard 93.99 30.00
Dropout 93.16 13.96
Adv Training 92.68 26.07
RFN 93.08 62.30
Adv Training
& RFN 94.81 68.77
Table 3: Classication accuracy vs. model resistance of dif-
ferent learning technologies on themalware dataset. In this
table, dropout rates are 50% and feature nullication rates
are 80%. ‘Adv Training’ simply means adversarial training.
Note that ’Standard’ means standard deep neural architec-
ture without any regularization.
so-called ‘cross-model’ adversarial samples 5, they are even more
vulnerable to more specically craed adversarial samples. ese
results are also consistent with those reported in [12]. is implies
that the regularization involved in adversarial training and dropout
oer poor general resistance to adversarial examples.
In comparison, RFN provides a signicantly beer resistance
against adversarial samples, as is shown in Table 3. e model
resistance aorded by our method improves more than 100% (rela-
tive error) when comparing with standard DNN. Recall that RFN
can also be viewed as a preprocessing approach for the successive
DNN. As such, it can be combined with other existing defense
mechanisms. It is expected that such a combination would further
improve model robustness. In order to verify this, we next combine
RNF with adversarial training and compare the hybrid approach to
both standalone RFN and adversarial training.
Table 3 species the classication accuracy and model resistance
of the hybrid technique. We observe that the combined technique
does indeed provide beer resistance when compared to standalone
RFN. is may due to the fact that RFN and adversarial training
penalize adversarial samples in two dierent manners, and an en-
semble of the two favorably amplies the model resistance that
each technique induces. From Table 3, we also notice that both
standalone RFN and aforementioned combined approach do slightly
but noticeably reduce classication accuracy. However, the combi-
nation of RFN and adversarial training results in near-negligible
degradation. is indicates that RFN, either standalone or when
combinedwith adversarial training, provides much beer resistance
either adversarial training and dropout on the malware dataset.
5.3 Image Recognition Results
In the following experiments, we examine the generality of our
proposed method by applying it to the MNIST and CIFAR-10 image
recognition tasks. For MNIST, we build a standard feed-forward
fully connected DNN, while for CIFAR-10, we build a convolutional
neural network (CNN). Similar to the experiments implemented on
malware dataset, we also implement two groups of experiments,
one for determining the optimal p on each dataset, and another for
comparing between dierent defense technologies. Other hyper-
parameters and neural architectural details appear in the Appendix.
5Adversarial samples that are craed from a dierent DNN that is built to approximate
some standard targeted DNN.
Expectation of
nullication rates
MNIST CIFAR-10
Accuracy Resistance
ϕ = 0.15 Accuracy
Resistance
ϕ = 0.15
10% 98.17% 70.39% 80.01% 55.87%
20% 98.09% 73.55% 77.62% 59.55%
30% 97.89% 78.31% 75.95% 61.63%
40% 97.53% 81.49% 74.49% 65.59%
50% 96.78% 83.68% 74.02% 67.85%
Table 4: Classication accuracy vs. model resistance with
various feature nullication rates on MNIST and CIFAR-10.
Hyper parameter σ is also set to be 0.05 in this evaluation.
As is shown in Table 4, the trend of accuracy and resistance
are consistent with that found in the malware experiments. Max-
imum resistance against adversarial image samples is reached at
50% nullication rate. With respect to classication accuracy, our
proposed method demonstrates roughly similar performance at
various nullication rates. Based on this result, we adopted 50% as
our feature nullication rate in the experiments to follow.
In Table 5, we show measures of classication accuracy and
model resistance of all aforementioned approaches on the MNIST
and CIFAR-10 datasets. Much as in the malware experiments, we
further evaluate our RFN method combined with adversarial train-
ing on both datasets. In Table 5, we also measure the resistance of
these DNN models against various coecients ϕ.
As is shown in Table 5, adversarial samples generated from a
standard DNN are capable of lowering the accuracy of the standard
DNN to as low as 0.01% on MNIST and 10.68% on CIFAR-10. In
contrast, all of the investigated defense mechanisms yield improved
resistance, with, again, models trained with RFN reaching the best
level of resistance. In addition, the combination of RFN with adver-
sarial training achieves the best resistance of 91.28 on MNIST and
74.12% on CIFAR-10. ough dierent than in the case of malware
classication, both dropout and adversarial training alone do pro-
vide somewhat improved resistance on both datasets. is indicates
that the resistance provided by these methods might be highly de-
pendent on the data type (images, in this case). In particular, since
adversarial training is designed to handle adversarial samples, it
demonstrates much beer resistance when compared directly to
dropout, though both methods oer model regularization.
As for classication accuracy, dropout achieves the highest accu-
racy on both datasets. For MNIST dataset, both RFN and adversarial
training, as well as their combination, do trade some classication
accuracy for beer resistance. However, for the CIFAR-10 dataset,
these methods demonstrate slightly improvement for accuracy. is
is due to the fact that the CIFAR-10 task is much more complex
than that of MNIST, hence the regularization provided by all of
these methods leads to improved generalization. In general, despite
the minor accuracy degradation caused by using RFN or the hy-
brid method, the signicant improvement over resistance in both
datasets demonstrates that our proposed method is quite promising
for classication tasks when resistance to adversarial samples is
important. Finally, our method is agnostic to the choice of the DNN
architecture, given that we evaluate RFN with both feed-forward
fully connected DNNs and CNNs (as evidenced in Table 5).
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Learning
Technology
MNIST CIFAR-10
Accuracy Resistance Accuracy Resistance
ϕ = 0.15 ϕ = 0.25 ϕ = 0.35 ϕ = 0.15 ϕ = 0.25 ϕ = 0.35
Standard 98.43 8.19 0.56 0.01 73.59 19.48 13.51 10.68
Dropout 98.61 19.51 3.86 0.96 81.07 17.43 16.59 16.40
Adv Training 97.46 67.68 28.37 7.62 80.62 33.97 19.76 13.73
RFN 96.78 83.69 71.44 60.69 74.02 67.85 51.89 41.29
Adv Training & RFN 96.11 91.28 84.92 78.18 74.12 71.03 55.49 49.84
Table 5: Classication accuracy vs. model resistance with dierent learning methods, under dierent ϕ, for both MNIST and
CIFAR-10. In this table, dropout rates and feature nullication rates are set 50% for both datasets.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a simple method for constructing deep
neural network models that are robust to adversarial samples. Our
design is based on a thorough analysis of neural model’s vulnera-
bility to adversarial perturbation as well as the limitations of pre-
viously proposed defenses. Using our proposed Random Feature
Nullication, we have shown that it is impossible for an aacker to
cra specically designed adversarial sample that can force a DNN
to misclassify its inputs. is implies that our proposed technology
does not suer, as previous methods do, from aacks that rely on
generating model-specic adversarial samples.
We apply our method to malware dataset and empirically demon-
strated that we signicantly improve model resistance with only
negligible sacrice of accuracy, compared to other defense mecha-
nisms. Cross-data generality was also demonstrated through exper-
iments in image recognition. Future work will entail investigating
the performance of our method to an even wider variety of applica-
tions.
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7 APPENDIX
To augment the experimental setup presented in Section 5, the
tables in this part contain the hyper parameters used for model
training.
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Learning Technologies Hyper ParametersDNN Structure Activation Optimizer Learning Rate Dropout Rate Batch Size Epoch
Standard DNN 784-784-784-784-10 Relu SGD 0.1 × 100 25
Dropout 784-784-784-784-10 Relu SGD 0.1 0.5 100 25
Adv. Training 784-784-784-784-10 Relu SGD 0.01 0.5 100 70
RFN 784-784-784-784-10 Relu SGD 0.1 0.25 100 25
RFN & Adv. Training 784-784-784-784-10 Relu SGD 0.01 0.25 100 70
Table 6: e hyper parameters of MNIST models: the network structure species the number of hidden layers and hidden
units in each layer. e last layer of eachmodel is followed by Somax non-linearity. Note that standard DNN stands for DNN
trained without any regularization.
Learning Technology Hyper ParametersDNN Structure Activation Optimizer Learning Rate Dropout Rate Batch Size Epoch
Standard DNN 5000-1000-100-2 Relu Adam 0.001 × 500 20
Dropout 5000-1000-100-2 Relu Adam 0.001 0.5 500 20
Adv. Training 5000-1000-100-2 Relu SGD 0.01 0.5 500 40
RFN 5000-1000-100-2 Relu Adam 0.001 0.5 500 15
RFN & Adv. Training 5000-1000-100-2 Relu SGD 0.01 0.5 500 40
Table 7: e hyper parameters of Malware models.
Learning Technology Hyper parametersActivation Optimizer Learning rate Dropout rate Batch Size Epoch
Standard DNN Relu Adam 0.001 × 128 50
Dropout Relu Adam 0.001 0.5 128 50
Adv. Training Relu SGD 0.01 0.5 128 50
RFN Relu Adam 0.001 0.5 128 50
RFN & Adv. Training Relu SGD 0.01 0.5 128 50
Table 8: e hyper parameters of CIFAR-10 models, in this evaluation we use CNN instead of standard DNN
Layer type Learning TechnologyStandard DNN Dropout Adv. Training RFN RFN & Adv. Training
Convolutional 64 lter(3 × 3) 64 lter(3 × 3) 64 lter(3 × 3) 64 lter(3 × 3) 64 lter(3 × 3)
Convolutional 64 lter(3 × 3) 64 lter(3 × 3) 64 lter(3 × 3) 64 lter(3 × 3) 64 lter(3 × 3)
Max pooling 2 × 2 2 × 2 2 × 2 2 × 2 2 × 2
Convolutional 72 lter(3 × 3) 72 lter(3 × 3) 128 lter(3 × 3) 128 lter(3 × 3) 128 lter(3 × 3)
Convolutional 72 lter(3 × 3) 72 lter(3 × 3) 128 lter(3 × 3) 128 lter(3 × 3) 128 lter(3 × 3)
Max pooling 2 × 2 2 × 2 2 × 2 2 × 2 2 × 2
Fully Connect 512 units 512 units 256 units 256 units 256 units
Fully Connect 256 units 256 units 256 units 256 units 256 units
Somax 10 units 10 units 10 units 10 units 10 units
Table 9: e network structure of CIFAR-10models: the activation function of convolutional layers and fully connected layers
are shown in Table 8.
